Flashpoints & Frameworks: Sub-Saharan Africa Security Outlook 2-Nov-2025
BLUF (Bottom-Line-Up-Front)
Conflict dynamics in late October to early November 2025 point to an elevated risk across Sudan, the eastern DRC, the Central Sahel, Somalia, and select coastal states. The RSF’s capture of El Fasher in North Darfur signals de facto partition dynamics in Sudan and a widening atrocity risk corridor. M23- and ADF-linked violence continues to degrade the humanitarian operating picture in eastern DRC. JNIM and IS-Sahel sustain tempo and geographic reach, while Somalia’s Al-Shabaab demonstrates capacity for symbolic, complex urban attacks even as ATMIS draws down. Politically, the UN Security Council’s endorsement of Morocco’s autonomy plan for Western Sahara reconfigures diplomatic baselines, Tanzania’s post-election violence underscores governance fragility (a separate report on Tanzania is forthcoming), Nigeria-U.S. friction raises sovereignty signaling in West Africa, and a Gambia-Morocco defense MoU hints at emerging south-south security architectures. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17]
Key Event & Developments
Sudan - RSF positional advantage. The RSF’s seizure of El Fasher consolidates military and coercive leverage across Darfur, heightens mass-atrocity indicators, and accelerates effective territorial bifurcation. Short-term risk includes escalated RSF filtering operations against perceived opponents, medical facility targeting, and broader displacement pressure on already saturated corridors. Medium-term risk includes cross-border destabilization via arms, mercenary flows, and contested supply lines reportedly tied to external enablers. [1][2][3][4][5][6]
DRC - Cascading humanitarian degradation. Fighting near the Goma corridor and continued ADF activity in North Kivu keep civilian harm and displacement high. Even with Doha-mediated steps on ceasefire monitoring, field realities reflect persistent contact and camp destruction from earlier offensives. Risk is compounded by munitions contamination, disease exposure, and criminal predation around displacement sites. [7][8][9]
Central Sahel - Entrenched insurgent eco-systems. JNIM and IS-Sahel sustain or expand operational reach, exploiting governance gaps and security-force overextension. Indicators include sustained lethal activity, drone use, and integration with illicit economies. Spillover risk to littoral states remains non-trivial, especially along Benin-Togo axes. [10][11][12]
Somalia - Strategic signaling by Al-Shabaab. The Mogadishu prison assault underscores the group’s ability to stage complex, morale-targeting operations despite military pressure and international support to Somali forces. Urban security optics and ATMIS transition milestones will remain decisive for public confidence and partner narratives. [13][14][15]
Political and diplomatic inflection points. The UN Security Council’s Western Sahara resolution favoring Morocco’s autonomy vision resets negotiation guardrails and could catalyze counter-mobilization by Polisario and allies. Tanzania’s post-election violence and contested casualty narratives highlight risks to civic space and crisis communications. Nigeria’s sovereignty signaling in response to U.S. rhetoric foreshadows tighter host-nation framing on external security cooperation. The Gambia’s defense MoU with Morocco is emblematic of diversified partnerships as ECOWAS faces headwinds. [16][17][6][12][18][19][20][21][22][23]
5W1H Analysis
Sudan - El Fasher
What: RSF captured El Fasher after an 18-month siege, with multiple credible reports of summary killings, hospital raids, and mass detentions. [1][2][3][4]
Where: North Darfur’s last SAF stronghold, a humanitarian hub anchoring regional displacement networks.
When: Rapid offensive culminating in late October 2025; aftermath still evolving. [2][3][4]
Who: RSF vs SAF and aligned actors; civilians, medical personnel, and IDPs acutely affected.
Why: RSF aims to consolidate Darfur control, shape bargaining power, and secure logistics lines. External enabling networks are alleged by Sudanese officials and media reporting. [5][6]
How: Combined maneuver, drone and indirect fire, urban breaching, coercive control measures, and information operations.
DRC - Goma Corridor and North Kivu
What: Persisting frontline fluidity around Goma and ongoing ADF atrocities keep displacement and civilian harm high, with earlier offensives destroying a large share of camp infrastructure. [7][8]
Where: North Kivu - Masisi, Rutshuru, Beni axes; Goma as logistics and humanitarian hub.
When: 2025 pattern with notable spikes; Doha monitoring step in mid-October did not stop field-level contact. [8][9]
Who: M23, FARDC, Wazalendo, ADF, and local militias; civilians and aid providers under pressure.
Why: Strategic terrain, access roads, taxation rackets, and cross-border supply advantages.
How: Encirclement patterns, indirect fires, small-unit raids, coercive taxation, and camp attacks by varied actors.
Central Sahel - JNIM and IS-Sahel
What: Elevated event levels with sustained insurgent tempo and widening geographic footprint. [10][11][12]
Where: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, with coastal corridors at risk of spillover.
When: October 2025 update confirms persistence; trendline is multi-year. [10]
Who: JNIM, IS-Sahel, community vigilantes, state forces.
Why: Governance vacuums, security-force strain, illicit economies, local grievance capture.
How: Complex attacks, IEDs, raids on administrative nodes, and coercive governance models.
Somalia - Al-Shabaab
What: High-profile Mogadishu prison assault, multi-hour siege, attackers neutralized. [13][14]
Where: Godka Jilacow facility near presidential precincts - symbolic targeting.
When: Early October 2025. [13][14]
Who: Al-Shabaab cells, Somali security forces, emergency services, civilians.
Why: To project capability, undermine state security optics, and generate propaganda.
How: Disguise, VBIED tactics, small arms, coordinated ingress, urban ISR adaptation. [13][14][15]
Diplomatic-Political
UNSC Western Sahara: Resolution endorses Morocco’s autonomy plan as the most feasible basis for settlement, renewing MINURSO and reshaping the diplomatic baseline. [16]
Tanzania elections: Opposition alleges mass casualties during protests; UN rights office confirms at least 10 deaths, government disputes higher figures and denies violations. [17][6]
Nigeria-U.S. tensions: U.S. rhetoric on religious freedom triggers Nigerian sovereignty framing; Abuja welcomes help that respects national control. [18][19][20]
Gambia-Morocco MoU: Defense cooperation covers training, exercises, and a rotating military commission - an example of diversified security partnerships. [21][22][23]
Framework Lens
Positive Peace - System Pillars Under Most Stress
Well-Functioning Government: Acute stress in Sudan, Tanzania, and parts of the DRC, where state legitimacy and rule-of-law perceptions are eroding under violence or contested political processes. [1][2][4][6][7][17]
Free Flow of Information: Information controls and competing narratives - including casualty disputes in Tanzania and atrocity reporting in Sudan - complicate verification and humanitarian messaging. [3][4][6][17]
Low Levels of Corruption and Sound Business Environment: Conflict-linked predation and illicit economies sustain armed actors in Sahel and DRC theaters, undermining formal markets. [10][12]
Acceptance of the Rights of Others: Sectarian framing in Nigeria’s discourse and ethnically tinged abuses in Sudan elevate inter-communal tensions. [18][19][3]
Global Fragility Act (GFA) - Lines of Effort (LoE) Mapping
LoE 1 - Governance and Social Cohesion: Prioritize social-contract investments in municipalities receiving surges of IDPs from El Fasher and North Kivu.
LoE 2 - Justice and Accountability: Support documentation of mass-atrocity indicators in El Fasher and attacks on medical facilities; enable survivor services and evidence chains. [3][4]
LoE 3 - Inclusive Economic Growth: Back rapid cash-for-work and livelihoods around humanitarian hubs to dampen recruitment incentives and criminal opportunism.
LoE 4 - Conflict Prevention and Stabilization: Expand community-based early warning, route-security coordination, and deconfliction for aid convoys across DRC and Sahel corridors. [7][10][11]
LoE 5 - External Actor Management: Calibrate diplomatic levers regarding alleged external enabling networks in Sudan and competing security compacts in West Africa; reduce proxy risk. [5][6][21][22]
Indicators to Watch - Next 2 to 4 Weeks
Sudan: Frequency of RSF detention-screening operations, patterns of execution sites, drone or indirect fire against remaining clinics, confirmed flight manifests or cargo patterns linked to external support routes. [3][4][5][6]
DRC: Attacks within 30 km of Goma’s critical lifelines, any breach events near camp clusters, ADF hostage counts and massacres, and practical activation of Doha monitoring. [7][8][9]
Sahel: JNIM taxation checkpoints on trunk roads, IS-Sahel raids on administrative nodes, and cross-border incidents touching Benin/Togo. [10][11][12]
Somalia: Copy-cat urban assaults targeting detention or judicial facilities and propaganda output tied to ATMIS milestones. [13][14][15]
Western Sahara: Polisario operational or diplomatic countermoves, Algerian signaling, and MINURSO posture changes post-vote. [16]
Tanzania: Verified casualty tallies, curfew enforcement patterns, and communications restrictions. [17][6]
Nigeria-U.S.: Official communiqués on rules of engagement for any bilateral security cooperation and domestic political positioning that could constrain operational collaboration. [18][19][20]
Gambia-Morocco: Implementation steps for the joint military commission - schedules, training pipelines, and exercise announcements. [21][22][23]
Scenarios - 90 Day Outlook
Baseline: Protracted volatility with localized escalations. RSF consolidates in Darfur while SAF regroups elsewhere; eastern DRC sees intermittent offensives and camp insecurity; Sahel insurgents maintain pressure; Al-Shabaab stages episodic urban attacks; Western Sahara track shifts to procedural diplomacy with periodic tensions. Net effect: continuing high humanitarian need, constrained access, and rising duty-of-care burdens. [1][2][3][4][7][10][13][16]
Downside: Escalatory spiral and spillover. RSF reprisals expand, triggering cross-border displacement toward Chad and Libya; a major incident along the Goma corridor forces large-scale evacuation of aid operations; JNIM/IS-Sahel execute coordinated multi-country attacks; Al-Shabaab targets judicial or diplomatic sites in Mogadishu; polarized narratives harden after UNSC’s Western Sahara decision. [3][4][7][10][13][16]
Upside: Containment and micro-de-escalation. Verified humanitarian corridors around El Fasher reduce immediate civilian targeting; Doha monitoring yields limited field-level confidence building near Goma; Sahel local dialogues temper violence along select road segments; Somali security services disrupt an Al-Shabaab urban cell; MINURSO mandate renewal creates space for calibrated CBMs in Western Sahara. Probability lower without strong donor-backed incentives and protection guarantees. [4][8][10][13][16]
Operational Implications for NGOs and Field Teams
Access and Protection: Treat all movements within 50 km of El Fasher and along the Goma corridor as red-risk pending updated route reconnaissance, ISR inputs, and liaison with humanitarian coordination cells. Bake in casualty collection points and alternate egress routes. [3][4][7]
Medical Neutrality: Anticipate elevated risk to clinics, ambulances, and medical staff in urban conflict zones; reinforce facility hardening and stealth protocols where appropriate. [4]
Crisis Communications: Pre-write statements for casualty disputes and contested narratives, including rapid-verification pathways; ensure media and beneficiary-protection clauses. [6][17]
Civic-Space and Legal: In Tanzania and parts of the Sahel, document protest-related restrictions and ensure HRDD (human rights due diligence) in any state-facing engagements. [6][11][17]
Partnering Strategy: Map south-south security compacts like Morocco-Gambia to anticipate training cycles, border procedures, and potential impacts on NGO permissions. [21][22][23]
Do-No-Harm and Community Relations: Expand cash-for-work and market-support where feasible to reduce predation risks and stabilize local acceptance in IDP-receiving areas. Align with Positive Peace pillars and GFA LoEs to strengthen donor messaging.
References
[1] International Crisis Group. El Fasher: A Bloody New Chapter in Sudan’s Ruinous War. 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sudan/el-fasher-bloody-new-chapter-sudans-ruinous-war
[2] Associated Press. Sudan’s paramilitary forces overrun the army’s last stronghold in the Darfur region. 2025. https://apnews.com/article/b3b2507e343f79e06ab6e31dc40732b0
[3] Reuters. The last functioning hospital in al-Fashir was raided; hundreds feared killed. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/last-hospital-darfurs-al-fashir-raided-hundreds-feared-dead-un-sudanese-2025-10-30/
[4] Reuters. Men shot after Darfur city’s fall; videos show RSF shooting captives. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/men-shot-by-hundreds-disappeared-after-sudanese-city-falls-paramilitaries-2025-10-31/
[5] Middle East Eye. Inside the UAE’s secret Sudan war operation at Somalia’s Bosaso. 2025. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/inside-uae-secret-operation-somalia-sudan-bosaso
[6] Financial Times. Sudan accuses UAE of sponsoring mercenaries to fight for rebels. 2025. https://www.ft.com/content/d4e3613c-dc30-42e8-b7ed-c69a470d6b81
[7] UN OCHA. Democratic Republic of the Congo - Overview and updates on North Kivu. 2025. https://www.unocha.org/democratic-republic-congo
[8] Reuters. Congo and M23 sign Doha deal on ceasefire monitoring. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-m23-sign-deal-doha-ceasefire-monitoring-sources-say-2025-10-14/
[9] Critical Threats. Congo War Security Review series, October 2025 updates. 2025. https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/congo-war-security-review-october-3-2025
[10] ACLED. Africa Overview: October 2025. 2025. https://acleddata.com/update/africa-overview-october-2025
[11] Associated Press. UN officials: Terrorist activity is surging in Africa’s Sahel. 2025. https://apnews.com/article/198f5a480c9d0b5a0667698aac599471
[12] Washington Post. A powerful, opaque al-Qaeda affiliate is rampaging across West Africa. 2025. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/06/08/jnim-militants-west-africa-sahel-terrorism/
[13] Reuters. Somali forces fighting Al-Shabaab attack on high-security prison in Mogadishu. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somali-forces-fighting-al-shabaab-attack-high-security-prison-2025-10-04/
[14] Associated Press. Somali government forces end a 6-hour siege at a major prison, killing all 7 attackers. 2025. https://apnews.com/article/f0661455c93886de0535c066a19b7c24
[15] Council on Foreign Relations. Conflict with Al-Shabaab in Somalia - Global Conflict Tracker. 2025. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/al-shabab-somalia
[16] Reuters. UN Security Council backs Morocco’s Western Sahara autonomy plan; MINURSO renewed. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/un-calls-western-sahara-talks-based-moroccos-autonomy-plan-2025-10-31/
[17] Reuters. UN rights office alarmed by killings in Tanzania protests; at least 10 reported dead. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/un-rights-office-alarmed-by-killings-tanzania-protests-2025-10-31/
[18] Reuters. Trump threatens U.S. military action in Nigeria over treatment of Christians. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/trump-says-christians-face-existential-threat-nigeria-adds-country-watch-list-2025-10-31/
[19] Reuters. Nigeria welcomes U.S. assistance that respects its sovereignty. 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-welcomes-us-assistance-fight-terrorism-presidency-spokesperson-says-2025-11-02/
[20] Deutsche Welle. Nigeria flaunts religious freedoms after U.S. designation. 2025. https://www.dw.com/en/nigeria-flaunts-religious-freedoms-after-trump-designation/a-74587490
[21] APA News. Morocco, Gambia establish joint military commission to boost cooperation. 2025. https://apanews.net/category/gambie-gambia/
[22] Ecofin Agency. Gambia turns to Morocco to reinforce its defenses - defense MoU. 2025. https://www.ecofinagency.com/news/0111-50055-gambia-turns-to-morocco-a-regional-military-power-to-reinforce-its-defenses
[23] FAAPA - MAP. Morocco - Gambia: Signing of a military cooperation agreement. 2025. https://www.faapa.info/en/morocco-gambia-signing-of-a-military-cooperation-agreement/
